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Britain, the Common Agricultural Policy and the Challenges of 
Membership in the European Community: A Political Balancing Act  
When the United Kingdom joined the European Community (EC) in January 
1973 it did not simply join a ‘common market’ for industrial goods, it joined a 
Community with a fully developed protectionist common agricultural policy 
(CAP). The policy encompassed up to ninety percent of the EC budget to which 
Britain was due to become a net contributor at the end of the transition period in 
1979. This article will analyse Britain’s tempestuous relationship with the CAP 
from the country’s accession to the end of the Labour government in 1979. 
Following accession, the country’s relationship with the EC became increasingly 
awkward as Labour leaders Harold Wilson and James Callaghan prioritised 
policies and favoured behaviour they deemed conducive to maintaining the unity 
of the Labour party. The perceived disadvantages of the CAP for Britain gave 
politicians additional justification for adopting a confrontational attitude towards 
the EC. The CAP, the article argues, can serve as a lens to shed light on the wider 
question of how Britain’s leading politicians adapted to Community membership 
politically, tactically and psychologically. 
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The common agricultural policy (CAP) was at the centre, and even the cause of, some 
of the most difficult episodes of Britain’s relationship with the European Community 
(EC): the renegotiation of the terms of membership in 1974/75 and the question of the 
British contribution to the EC budget in the early 1980s, not to mention both sets of 
accession negotiations, 1961-3 and 1970-1.1 Britain’s difficulties with the CAP – the 
Community’s flagship policy in the 1960s and 1970s – have set the tone for the 
relationship between Britain and the rest of the Community, sealing Britain’s reputation 
as an ‘awkward partner’ in Europe.2 However, with regard to the CAP Stephen 
George’s dictum needs to be at least nuanced. When French President Charles de 
Gaulle’s veto denied the United Kingdom entry into the Community in 1963, it had to 
wait another ten years before it was able to join the EC in January 1973. By then, ‘the 
Six’ had constructed a Community that worked for their interests, and this included a 
fully developed common agricultural policy. Due to its late arrival in the Community, 
Britain had not been able to contribute to the design of the agricultural policy, nor 
influence the crucial decision how the Community - and thus the CAP - would be 
financed, a decision that the other member states took in 1970. When joining, Britain 
had to accept the acquis communautaire, that is it had to subscribe to existing 
Community policies and rules. Britain’s engagement with the CAP as a central 
Community policy can shed light on the country’s difficult process of political, tactical 
and indeed psychological adaptation to EC membership.  
The CAP became an obstacle to Britain’s smooth transition and adaptation to 
EC membership also because the policy seemed to challenge deeply held British 
attitudes towards food prices and loyalty to traditional Commonwealth exporters of 
food. The UK traditionally imported large amounts of its foodstuff from overseas, 
usually at cheaper prices than those in the EC market. When Britain became a member 
of the EC, many of these preferential agricultural trade arrangements with the 
Commonwealth had to be phased out during the transition period. Maintaining access 
for New Zealand butter imports became one of the issues British agricultural ministers 
repeatedly battled over in Brussels. During the 1970s, spending on the CAP soared and 
at times reached ninety percent of the EC budget.3 The Community’s budget, its ‘own 
resources’, were financed through levies on agricultural imports and customs receipts 
on imports of industrial goods, as well as a one percent contribution drawn from a 
member state’s Value Added Tax (VAT). Britain, as a major importer of both industrial 
and agricultural products, would thus contribute more to the budget than most other 
member states, except West Germany.4 As to receipts from the budget, the UK was set 
to receive comparatively little as it had a fairly small and efficient agricultural sector 
and was not due to receive much in terms of support for its farm sector. As other 
policies, such as Community regional or social policies, were still in their infancy and 
could not claim any significant share of the budget, at the end of the transition period in 
1979 Britain was set to become a net contributor to the budget. Given that in the 1970s 
Britain was one of the poorer member states in the Community and was facing 
enormous economic challenges, it is not surprising that the CAP and the British 
contribution to the EC budget became bones of contention even before full financial 
contributions were due to be paid. The mounting domestic opposition to EC 
membership more generally, the struggle of adapting to the CAP and the failures to 
devise a clear strategy for reform of the policy and gain allies in the Community for 
such a reform did not bode well for Britain’s future relations with and performance in 
the Community.      
Britain’s relationship with ‘Europe’ has been the subject of a number of books, 
often written by practitioners who, as civil servants or journalists, have been 
participants in or eyewitnesses of Britain’s relationship with the EC.5 Roy Denman’s 
Missed Chances expressed the personal disappointment of a British civil servant in 
Brussels with, in his eyes, Britain’s embarrassingly nationalistic and parochial dealings 
with the Community.6 Historians’ accounts of Britain’s relations with the EC still focus 
mainly on the accession negotiations in 1961-3 and the second bid for membership of 
1967,7 with Stephen Wall’s two volumes of the Official History of Britain and the 
European Community covering the 1960s and the period up to 1985 being the 
exception.8 In studies on the UK’s relationship with the EC both the 1970s and the CAP 
are usually treated rather cursorily.9 The policy makes brief appearances in analyses of 
the 1974/5 renegotiation and, later, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s battle for a 
rebate from British contributions to the EC budget. Hugo Young’s Blessed Plot, for 
example, hardly mentions the CAP at all. George even claims that the issue of the CAP 
and its effect on food prices in Britain ‘did not return to the level of political debate’ 
following the renegotiation in 1974/5; nothing could be further from the truth as this 
article will show.10  
The article uses the CAP as an example to highlight British governments’ 
struggle of finding a role in the Community during the 1970s. It explores the difficulty 
of reconciling opposing UK and continental farm policy approaches, the domestic 
constraints facing UK politicians as well as behavioural patterns and political 
miscalculations that contributed to the limited success British governments had in 
reforming the CAP in its first decade of membership. The article argues that against the 
backdrop of a difficult political and economic climate and a British public that was 
increasingly hostile to EC membership, party-political considerations guided decision-
making on the CAP in Brussels. While it would be interesting to explore how far the 
CAP contributed to shaping the domestic attitude of the public towards the EC, this 
question would exceed the scope of the article. However, the issue of public opinion is 
important: British politicians of both the Conservative and Labour parties assumed that 
the public cared deeply about food prices and the CAP’s scandalous food mountains. 
Indeed, Saunders confirms that ‘the politics of food had always had a special resonance 
in British politics.’11 This assumption thus guided politicians’ calculations in their 
interaction with the EC.12  
The article will, first, briefly outline the different paths agricultural policy has 
taken in the UK and in continental Europe since the 19th century until UK accession to 
the EC in 1973. It will then analyse the Labour governments’ attitude towards the CAP 
and EC membership more generally in 1974-79. This part focuses both on the half-
hearted attempts by the British government to reform the CAP and how the policy, with 
its perceived effects on consumer prices and the British budget contribution, became a 
domestic policy and party political issue in the quarrel between pro- and anti-
Marketeers. The third part of the article discusses the reasons for the failure of the 
British government to gain allies for CAP reform in the Community while the fourth 
part provides an outlook on the British government’s rising concern over the UK’s 
contribution to the EC budget, an issue that escalated in the early 1980s. 
 
2. ‘Dear Food’ Versus ‘Cheap Food’: Two Paths of Agricultural Policy  
Since the 19th century, Britain’s domestic agricultural policy has taken a very different 
path to that of most continental European countries. In continental Europe, agricultural 
protectionism had become the norm in the 1880s when Germany raised import duties 
for grain and livestock to limit cheap grain imports from the United States and Russia. 
From then on any attempt to revert to free trade in agricultural products was countered 
by a very powerful farmers’ lobby (the Junker in Prussia). In addition to this, countries 
such as France and Germany developed and nurtured a mind-set that elevated 
agriculture and what was often called the ‘rural way of life’ to occupy a special status in 
society.13 This ‘special status’ of the farmer was subsequently used to justify subsidies 
to the agricultural sector – first in the individual member states before 1957 and 
subsequently also within the European Economic Community (EEC). The concern of 
continental European governments for their agricultural community (and thus the farm 
vote) was understandable considering that farming was still a fairly large economic 
sector: in 1959 fifteen percent of the German workforce were still employed in farming. 
In France it was twenty-seven and in Italy even thirty percent, though these numbers 
declined throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In Britain in 1960 merely five percent of the 
workforce were employed in the agricultural sector.14  
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the EEC contained a suite of articles 
on the introduction of a common agricultural policy (Articles 38-47). The objectives of 
the policy were: to increase agricultural production by promoting technical progress; to 
ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; to stabilise markets; to 
ensure stability of supplies and to ensure that supplies reach the consumers at 
reasonable prices. The treaty did not prescribe the shape or form of the future common 
agricultural policy. Why then did the six original member states opt for a substantial 
integration of their agricultural policies? There was strong interest among some member 
states, most of all France and the Netherlands, to create a common market for 
agricultural products to complement the one for industrial products. France’s post-war 
economic recovery relied partly on modernising the agricultural sector and increasing 
exports of foodstuffs. The French government therefore expected the EEC to provide a 
reliable export market to soak up the country’s agricultural surpluses. The German 
government on the other hand had been reluctant to endorse integration in the 
agricultural sector; it had a small and fairly inefficient agricultural sector, which it 
wanted to protect from EEC competition. Moreover, as an importer of foodstuffs a 
common market for agricultural products would lead to Germany absorbing surpluses 
from within the common market; German consumers would thus fund French and 
Dutch farmers.15 Later on, this led to Britain’s (erroneous) belief that the German 
government would be a natural ally for CAP and budgetary reform. 
The diverging interests in the CAP resulted in lengthy and dramatic meetings of 
the EEC Council of Ministers during which the policy took shape throughout the 
1960s.16 The successful outcomes of these Council meetings were regularly hailed as 
important steps towards a united Europe. The CAP became the Community’s flagship 
policy and was, alongside the common commercial policy, the first common policy that 
was fully operational. It established an integrated common market for agricultural 
products administered by the European Commission in Brussels. For the most important 
products, such as grain, dairy and beef, market organisations were set up and farmers 
were paid guaranteed minimum prices for their production. Farm prices were geared 
towards ensuring a fair income for farmers (Article 39, EEC treaty), so that price policy 
in reality became income policy and was seen as such by Europe’s farm ministers.17  
The CAP market was a protected market, shielded from competition from third 
countries. Prices on the world market were usually lower than those in the Community. 
Variable import levies thus increased the prices of food imports from third countries 
upon entering the Community. The difference between the original price of the 
commodity and the price following the imposition of the variable levy constituted an 
income for the Community. Exports from the Community to the world market were 
supported and farmers received the full price for the product with the Community 
making up the difference between the lower world market price and the higher internal 
Community price (export refunds). The compromises in the Council of Ministers meant 
that the policy had inbuilt flaws that would come to the fore later on. Generally the 
prices the EEC adopted were relatively high, as they tended to follow the country with 
the higher price level. In the case of the common price for grains, for example, low 
price countries such as France and the Netherlands had to compromise with high price 
countries such as Germany, resulting in the adoption of common grains prices above 
world market prices.18 Alongside technical advancements in machinery and fertilisers, 
higher agricultural prices incentivised production and this soon led to agricultural 
surpluses. These surpluses contributed to the high costs of the policy, as there was no 
cap imposed on the amount the Community would pay out. CAP spending was an 
obligatory item in the EEC budget. Still, the stakes for changing or reforming the CAP 
were high with most member states benefiting from the policy.19  
Since the middle of the 19th century Britain had embarked on an agricultural 
Sonderweg in Europe. First, the enclosure movement had resulted in large and unified 
farms with high productivity and a comparably small labour force; in 1900 a mere eight 
percent of the total active population was employed in agriculture. Second, the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846 had opened the path to a free trade system open to imports from 
overseas, reducing food prices and favouring consumers over farmers.20 This had 
instilled in the British population the ideal of ‘cheap bread’. Only in the early 1930s, 
following the onset of the Great Depression, did the British government give in to 
protectionism when it imposed import duties on most agricultural products. This did not 
concern imports from the British Empire and Commonwealth, however, and as a result 
imports from Canada, New Zealand and Australia increased.21 This trading relationship 
was maintained and deepened after the Second World War. It also became ideologically 
important to British governments and the public due to the support the Dominions had 
given to Britain in both the First and Second World Wars.  
In 1947 the Agriculture Act introduced a deficiency payments scheme in the UK 
that paid farmers the difference between the lower market price and a guaranteed 
price.22 This system allowed governments to combine a policy of cheap food and 
supplying the domestic market with imports from third countries with continuing 
support for British farmers. The system was not cheap as the market prices were 
generally well below the guaranteed prices, but instead of the consumer footing the bill, 
as was the case with the CAP, it was the government, and thus the taxpayer, that paid 
producer subsidies through direct payments to farmers. 
 
The CAP and Britain’s Entry into the Community  
The CAP presented several disadvantages for the UK. Firstly, with its in-built 
Community preference, the CAP threatened Britain’s traditional Commonwealth trading 
preferences. Secondly, the UK would have to gradually change its own domestic farm 
support system and adapt to that of the CAP. Thirdly, the CAP, due to higher 
commodity prices, would result in an increase in food prices for British consumers and, 
finally, the UK’s status as an importer of food meant that Britain would become a net 
contributor to the EC budget.23  
Britain’s first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
submitted in 1961. By then, parts of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF) (but not the National Farmers Union, NFU) had accepted the idea of adopting 
the CAP and using it to introduce a more protectionist system to nurture the 
development of the British agricultural sector, even if it was at the expense of 
Commonwealth imports. CAP protection would allow the UK to develop its own 
agricultural sector rather than continuing to be the ‘dumping ground’ for 
Commonwealth agricultural surpluses - though it was not acceptable to say this 
publicly. The spiralling costs of the deficiency payments system was another reason 
why the CAP, deemed to be cheaper for the Exchequer’s purse, looked attractive. It was 
also found that most UK farmers would not be worse off under the CAP than under the 
deficiency payments system.24 Rather, it was the likely increase in food prices for 
consumers and thus the end of ‘cheap bread’ that worried Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan’s Conservative government. The government was keen to enter the 
Community rather sooner than later to be able to shape the CAP. It was precisely this 
quest to influence the CAP, however, which partly motivated the unilateral ending of 
the negotiations by French President de Gaulle in January 1963.25  
After de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969, a Tory government under Prime 
Minister Edward Heath made another attempt at joining the Community in 1970. By 
then ‘the Six were much less worried than they were in 1961 that the British would try 
to undermine the system they had so painfully and so recently put together’.26 The 
passage of time had also seen a change in priorities in the UK: Maintaining a flow of 
food imports from the Commonwealth had become less important to the British public. 
The proportion of Commonwealth imports to Britain had dropped from thirty-nine to 
twenty-five percent. Only New Zealand dairy and Commonwealth sugar imports were 
still seen as high priority topics.27 Even the NFU under its president Lord Henry Plumb 
was no longer hostile to membership and the CAP.28  
Even with the CAP seemingly more acceptable, shortly before the start of 
accession negotiations the Community took a crucial decision on the financing of the 
Community, and thus the CAP, that would affect Britain greatly. As mentioned above, 
the EC budget would be financed through income from agricultural levies, customs 
duties on industrial goods imported from third countries and a one percent levy on the 
VAT raised in the member states.29 Given that Britain relied on food imports and also 
imported many of its industrial products from overseas, this financial mechanism meant 
that Britain would become a net payer to the Community budget. Furthermore, with its 
small and comparably efficient farm sector, Britain was not set to benefit much from the 
CAP, the biggest item on the budget by far. 
While all other member states welcomed the UK’s entry, the French government 
still needed convincing. During high-level meetings, Prime Minister Heath and French 
President Pompidou discussed the most contentious issues in the negotiations: New 
Zealand butter and the budget. Pompidou was allegedly only prepared to compromise 
on one issue: New Zealand or the budget. Heath famously chose New Zealand butter 
and cheese imports over the British budget contribution to placate the British public 
where sympathy for New Zealand remained strong. Heath’s reasoning was that the 
financial issue would only be felt some years down the line, at the end of the transition 
period, and that by then, surely, the CAP would have been reformed. On the British 
budget contribution, Heath merely obtained an assurance that should an unacceptable 
situation arise, the Community would address the issue and seek a solution.30 The 
budget was thus an unexploded time bomb. Community mechanisms or alternative 
common policies that could potentially alleviate the problem were not sufficiently 
developed during the 1970s. While the UK government obtained assurances that the 
Community would create a regional policy, funded by a regional development fund, 
from which the UK would have benefited, this was not set up before 1975, with funds 
nowhere near as important as those flowing into the CAP.31 The Treaty of Accession 
also included the Declarations on Hill Farming, an agreement to establish a hill-farming 
scheme helping farmers in disadvantaged areas along the lines of an already existing 
scheme in the UK.32 The directive on less favoured areas indeed came into effect in 
1975 but it did not make a lot of difference to the UK’s receipts from the budget.  
Instead, the gradual phasing in of the CAP was thought to have increased 
consumer prices by 13 percent by 1979 (though less than the 18-26 percent the 1970 
White Paper had estimated).33 In the context of the economic crisis of the 1970s and the 
deep transformations Western economies were undergoing in the period, leading to 
structural unemployment and high inflation, it was not easy for the British government 
to convey how these sacrifices were outweighed by the advantages of Community 
membership. Instead, the CAP became a bone of contention between Britain and the 
Community as well as a domestic policy issue exploited by anti-Marketeers eager to 
show that EC membership did not benefit Britain’s economy and its citizens.    
 
Coping with the CAP 
The Heath government understood that it was essential to accept the CAP to take 
Britain into the Community and then try to change the policy from within. However, for 
Heath and successor governments the stakes for CAP reform were higher than 
anticipated. A lack of allies in the Community as well as the inability of the British 
government to present a convincing alternative to the current CAP system meant that 
the strategy of ‘join now and negotiate later’ failed. Heath, and the Labour governments 
under Prime Ministers Wilson and Callaghan, underestimated the centrality of the 
policy for the Community as well as the entrenched interests in the policy in the 
Commission and most member states.34 New members Ireland and Denmark, joining 
alongside Britain in 1973, could not be counted on to push for reform as they were set 
to benefit from the CAP. The centrality of the CAP in Community decision-making 
immediately puzzled British senior civil servants and politicians.35 The new British 
vice-president of the Commission in Brussels, Sir Christopher Soames, complained to 
Heath that agriculture dominated the affairs of the Commission and that this would have 
to change.36 On the other hand, Heath’s Cabinet secretary and head of the European 
Unit in the Cabinet Office, Sir John Hunt, suggested a more conciliatory and subtle 
strategy: ‘We shall need to work very hard to obtain support for our views and, above 
all, to avoid being in a minority of one. The truth is that we are in a perpetual state of 
negotiation with our partners, and presentation is an integral part of getting what we 
want.’37 This was good advice that, it must be said, was later rarely heeded, at least with 
regard to the CAP.  
Even though the change from a Tory to a Labour government is often seen as a 
watershed, in terms of their respective relations with the EC both governments’ 
approaches to the CAP were similar, differing more in tone than in substance. In his 
memoirs Heath himself argued that his Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Godber, had 
already been pressing for CAP reform following accession, particularly to reduce costs 
and surpluses through tackling the CAP’s price mechanisms.38 In early 1973, the 
government came under pressure from anti-Marketeers in parliament who argued that 
price rises in the CAP were the cause of increased food prices in the UK even though 
world-wide conditions, in particular the onset of the World Food Crisis, were more to 
blame. The first Agriculture Council in spring 1973 became a challenge to reconcile the 
wish to be perceived as a cooperative member of the EC while limiting price rises, 
something Godber managed fairly well, limiting the increase of consumer prices in the 
UK to 0.2 per cent overall as well as gaining assurance that the Commission would 
conduct a review of the CAP.39  Heath had thus some reason to be optimistic about his 
ability to change the CAP or at least to limit its effects on Britain. However, the fate of 
the previous EC reform memorandum, the so-called ‘Mansholt Plan’ of 1968, should 
have made Heath wary as to the feasibility of far-reaching CAP reform. This radical 
reform proposal triggered massive farm protests in continental Europe and merely 
resulted, after years of acrimonious negotiations, in three structural policy directives.40 
Heath should not have had any illusion that a reform of the CAP would be easy. Britain 
was faced with a pro-farm front made up of the Commission and leading member states 
such as France. However, the gradual approach Godber had embarked upon and 
Labour’s Fred Peart continued, might have reaped rewards had Callaghan allowed it to 
continue. 
 
3. The CAP and the Labour Governments 1974-79 
Renegotiation 
The general election in February 1974 restored Harold Wilson as prime minister of a 
Labour government. For Britain’s relationship with the Community, the six years of 
Labour government during a period of severe economic crisis did not bode well. 
Divided over the issue of European integration since 1945, during its time in opposition, 
the Labour party had become more hostile to British EC membership.41 To placate the 
anti-Marketeers, in its election manifesto Labour had pledged a renegotiation of the 
terms of British membership, including ‘major changes in the Common Agricultural 
Policy so that it ceases to be a threat to world trade in food products, and so that low-
cost producers outside Europe can continue to have access to the British food market’ 
and ‘new and fairer methods of financing the European Community budget’.42 The 
results of this renegotiation should be put to the British people in a referendum. 
However, even though the manifesto demanded ‘major changes’ to the CAP, Wilson 
and his Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, were in fact not set on a particular outcome 
regarding the CAP. They merely wanted concessions from the Community that could be 
presented to Parliament and the British public as a ‘success’ in order to appease Labour 
anti-Marketeers and justify campaigning for remaining in the EC. Anti-Marketeers such 
as Labour MP and Minister of State in the Department of Industry, Eric Heffer, 
however, took the phrasing ‘major changes’ literally and demanded that the 
‘fundamental principles of the CAP’ needed indeed to be challenged.43 Following the 
vote on the renegotiated terms on 9 April 1975 where Heffer went into the ‘No’ lobby, 
Wilson sacked him as minister.44 Before the vote, Callaghan reminded Heffer that 
Labour had decided to seek ‘our agricultural objectives by negotiating within the 
CAP’45. This approach was in fact not much different to how the Heath government had 
envisaged proceeding after accession. Instead of battling for a ‘major’ reform, 
Callaghan, who led the renegotiations, was content to accept solutions to very specific 
issues the UK had with the policy. The agreements made at the Dublin European 
Council on 10-11 March 1975 included an automatic correcting mechanism for the 
British, or any member states’, budget contribution at the end of the transition period 
(but only if GDP was 85 percent or less of the Community average) and concessions for 
New Zealand dairy products, for example that butter imports at 1974/5 levels could 
continue at those levels beyond 1977 when they were due to be phased out.46 More 
generally, in September 1974 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt himself had 
proposed a fundamental review of the CAP to address the British problems and also to 
express his own frustration with the CAP. Like the ‘Improvement of the CAP’ 
memorandum of 1973, the ensuing ‘Stocktaking’ exercise at least held the promise of 
future CAP reform and could be used by the British government to demonstrate that 
things were moving in the right direction on the CAP.47 While not addressing the CAP 
directly, the Lomé Convention concluded in February 1975 between the EC and 46 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, many of them Commonwealth members, dealt 
with the renegotiation demand for a fairer deal for developing countries.48  
Finally, the renegotiation coincided with the World Food Crisis in 1974/75 that 
had resulted in worldwide food shortages and pushed up food prices on the world 
market, thus ensuring, for the time being at least, a comparably secure supply at 
reasonable prices for the EC due to the CAP. For Wilson and Callaghan, these results 
were deemed sufficient to campaign in favour of remaining in the EC in the referendum 
of June 1975. Saunders convincingly demonstrates that the ‘Britain in Europe’ 
campaign successfully used the World Food Crisis to deflect anti-Marketeers’ 
arguments that membership was to blame for food price increases. Instead, as prices 
were rising faster outside the Community than inside, they turned it into an argument 
about the CAP providing food security at reasonable prices.49  
The referendum resulted in a decision of 67 percent of the British population 
voting ‘yes’ to Britain staying in the Community.50 However, for the anti-Marketeers in 
the government and the Labour party these corrections fell far short of a ‘major reform’ 
of the CAP and therefore did nothing to silence their opposition to the policy and EC 
membership as a whole. 
During and after the renegotiations, the relationship between agricultural 
minister Fred Peart and his continental counterparts was cooperative and promised a 
new beginning in the relationship between the Labour government and the Community. 
Until the early 1970s, Peart had opposed British entry to the Community and the CAP, 
but according to Pimlot, he had not been absolutely ‘committed against the Wilson 
government trying to get in’ in 1967.51 When Labour took over government in 1974, 
Peart as Agricultural Minister had changed his mind and, according to Michael Palliser, 
became ‘passionately pro-European’.52 Some attribute his conversion to his close 
collaborator, Permanent Secretary in MAFF, Freddie Kearns, who had been responsible 
for the agriculture portfolio during the accession negotiations and had an excellent grasp 
of the subject matter.53 Perhaps it was Kearns’ authority and experience in Brussels, 
which made it seem possible to Peart that Britain could play an instrumental role in 
gradually modifying the CAP or at least gaining advantages for British agriculture.  
This was borne out in the negotiations for the agricultural price package in 
January and February 1975, where the UK gained concessions such as the beef 
premium, effectively allowing Britain to continue the deficiency payment system for 
this commodity and add it to the CAP as a scheme open not only to the UK but other 
member states as well, funded with £45m from the Community budget. Britain had thus 
achieved a ‘basic change in the Community’s beef regime’ and obtained an increase in 
the butter subsidy. In addition, at this Council meeting ministers also adopted the Less 
Favoured Area Directive of which Britain was a net beneficiary.54 Callaghan and 
Wilson were content with the outcome and congratulated Peart; anti-Marketeers, 
however, such as Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, Barbara Castle, and 
Secretary of Trade, Peter Shore, were not placated.55  
These negotiations demonstrate that a different and more cooperative kind of 
approach to the Community could reap results. However, Peart’s, and his right hand 
man Kearns’, days at the helm of MAFF were numbered and the renegotiation was not 
the end of British opposition to the CAP. For the Labour government the notion that the 
CAP contributed to increasing food prices for the British consumer and, with inflation 
already rocketing, contributed to a general increase in prices, was hard to bear and 
increasingly caused difficulties within the Labour party. The government also became 
more and more concerned with the fact that at the end of the transition period in 1979 
Britain would be hit with the full costs of membership, contributing to a budget that was 
continuously driven upwards by spending increases on the CAP. It was on those two 
issues that the British government did battle in Brussels for the remainder of the 1970s.  
 
John Silkin, the CAP and the UK Presidency of 1977 
In September 1976, Peart was replaced as Agriculture Minister by John Silkin, who had 
campaigned against British membership in the referendum campaign in 1975. Callaghan 
thus put a convinced anti-European in charge of dealing with the Community’s most 
important, most visible, most expensive and most contentious policy.56 As a staunch 
anti-Marketeer, Silkin saw his role in Brussels as one of open opposition to the EC. He 
took pride in his achievements of blocking decisions: ‘Deadlock [in the Council of 
Ministers] occurs if dissenting Ministers [i.e. himself] have enough willpower and 
physical stamina to conquer their weariness and fight on.’57 He preferred ‘total 
opposition’ to what he deemed the ‘continental’ habit of compromise where the 
minority eventually, after extracting minor concessions, adhered to the majority view.58 
Silkin’s ‘total opposition’, however, did not achieve the desired results and, like the 
continental tactic of holding out for concessions, it also only obtained him minor 
concessions when negotiations resumed, but the tactic contributed decidedly to 
poisoning the atmosphere. Silkin showed little understanding and tolerance for other 
ministers’ needs and domestic constraints. His aim was to cause maximum outrage in 
Brussels to play to the growing domestic Eurosceptic audience in the Labour party and 
the British public.59 Tellingly, he used combat vocabulary not only when describing his 
relationship with his continental counterparts but also with the more integration friendly 
Foreign and Cabinet Offices in Whitehall: ‘In my three years as Agriculture Minister I 
found myself fighting not only the other member states, but the Foreign Office in both 
London and Brussels.’60 He called the Cabinet Office ‘an instrument of appeasement’ 
with Brussels.61 
Unlike his predecessor, Silkin did not believe that CAP reform was possible or 
indeed desirable given that his aim remained ending Britain’s membership of the EC. 
He thus did not put forward any ideas for reform that went beyond resisting commodity 
price rises.62 Instead, he tried to extract the maximum gain for the UK, for example by 
adjusting the rate of the ‘green pound’ through which income for UK farmers could be 
increased while prices in Britain could stay relatively low,63 while at the same time 
limiting the financial implications of the CAP for Britain by insisting on the lowest 
possible price increases in the annual price negotiations. The British government’s 
position on the CAP was thus a frustrating one for its Community partners, often 
denying other farm ministers the price rises they were demanding for their own farmers.  
What were Callaghan’s motives for appointing Silkin to the post? As Prime 
Minister of an unstable minority government, Callaghan found himself in a difficult 
position. On the one hand, he had to honour Britain’s membership in the EC and 
establish a constructive relationship with his European counterparts. On the other, he 
faced a deepening divide in the Labour party at home between the pro- and anti-
Marketeers as well as having to deal with the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. 
Callaghan himself was a self-confessed ‘agnostic’ when it came to European integration 
and he was critical of the CAP.64 In Silkin he had a strong and determined politician 
calling out the policy’s wastefulness and ‘doing battle’ in Brussels without Callaghan 
having to do so himself. This was bound to go down well with the anti-Marketeers in 
his Cabinet, Parliament and the Labour party. Domestically the CAP became 
increasingly contested as it was seen to increase food prices and fuel inflation. Silkin’s 
confrontational attitude was useful to demonstrate to the public that the government was 
fighting for ‘British interests’. However, an appointment such as Silkin’s demonstrated 
to Britain’s Community partners the government’s lack of commitment to Community 
membership and contributed to establishing Britain’s reputation as an awkward partner 
in the Community. What is less clear, though, is why Callaghan gave such a prominent 
platform to an ambitious politician who had his eyes on the party leadership.  
A particularly ‘awkward’ moment came in the first half of 1977 when the UK 
was due to take over the Council presidency in the Community. Alternating every six 
months between member states, this allowed a member to set the agenda of European 
Council meetings and occupy the chair in the Council of Ministers meetings. The UK 
government came to see the 1977 presidency mainly as an opportunity to advance 
British interests in the Community. Aiming to mimic what they perceived as the more 
successful French government’s approach towards the EC, in a Cabinet meeting 
discussing the presidency in June 1976, Callaghan suggested to: ‘make the Community 
dimension part of our departmental thinking and pursue this with the same 
determination as the French: but in so doing we should also remember the need 
sometimes to cloak a hard position in suitably “communautaire” doctrine and 
phraseology.’65 In short, adopting suitably ‘communautaire’ language was seen as 
automatically bringing the right results for Britain. The Cabinet agreed that the 
presidency should be used to ‘demand major reforms of the Common Agricultural 
Policy’.66 In the meeting Agricultural Minister Peart, then still in post, constructively 
proposed procedural changes to decision-making in the CAP, for instance to involve 
consumer organisations in preparing the agricultural price proposals and to establish a 
joint Agriculture/Finance Council. Such changes to the CAP decision-making process 
aimed at limiting price increases and keeping the costs of the CAP down. His 
suggestion how to achieve Britain’s aims was also fairly suave, ‘we should … organize 
the discussions more sensibly with time for reference to capitals before the final 
settlement’.67 If pursued, these changes could have indeed had an impact on the further 
development of the CAP. Consumers as well as Finance Ministers had notoriously little 
to say in CAP decision-making, which was left to Agricultural Ministers under the 
influence of powerful farm lobbies. However, Peart’s suggestions were not taken up by 
his successor, Silkin.  
When Britain took the presidency in early 1977, one of the first items on the 
agenda was the annual price negotiation in the Council of Agricultural Ministers. Not 
surprisingly, Silkin did not attempt to play the role of the impartial chairman at the 
Council, eager to achieve a satisfactory result for all member states. Instead, the Cabinet 
had agreed to ‘take as tough a line as was compatible with the avoidance of 
confrontation’.68 However, according to Denman, Silkin was deliberately 
confrontational without gaining much by blocking a decision. Denman concluded that 
the annual price review was ‘the episode which did most damage to Britain’s 
reputation’ in the Community.69 Silkin delayed an agreement of the ministers to obtain a 
small rise in the subsidy on butter granted to the UK to compensate for price increases. 
The other ministers wanted to settle for seven pence per lb of butter which Silkin’s 
entourage deemed ‘just acceptable’. Silkin however declined the offer so that the 
Council had to meet again a month later, only to settle for 8.5 pence per lb, achieving 
‘no significant change’ and having had to ‘climb down’. Denman also deplored that the 
Foreign Office did not intervene as it considered this a technical detail, apparently not 
appreciating the damage Silkin’s opposition did to Britain’s first ever presidency and its 
reputation in the Community more generally.70 Denman’s judgement was scathing: ‘It is 
doubtful whether the British reputation in Europe has ever really recovered from this 
setback.’71 German weekly Der Spiegel also deplored that Britain unashamedly fought 
for its national interests while in the presidency chair, using Silkin’s performance in the 
Council as an example. The magazine referred to a new disease affecting Brussels 
following the presidency: ‘galloping Anglophobia’.72 
 
Foreign Secretary David Owen’s report on the presidency acknowledged that 
‘there has been some criticism of our presidency for lack of restraint in this respect 
[pursuing national interests]’.73 The report’s analysis of the results of the CAP 
negotiations then drew attention to the advantages obtained for the UK, thus showing 
that by manipulating the rate of the green pound (a 7.5 percent devaluation had been 
decided at the Council), price increases added only 0.5 percent to the price index for 
consumers, while British farmers enjoyed an increase of farm prices of 10 percent.74 
Seen in this light, UK advocacy of price restraint in the name of Community interest 
while at the same time manipulating the green rate of the pound to benefit UK farmers 
was dishonest. 
In a domestic context, in the late 1970s the CAP became increasingly the target 
of opponents of British membership in the Community both within the parliamentary 
Labour party and the party as a whole. The press also became more critical of EC 
membership and questioned whether the benefits of membership outweighed the costs 
and disadvantages with which the CAP was associated. In a House of Commons debate 
in July 1977, Labour MP Dennis Canavan’s question to Silkin was symptomatic of the 
general mood: Can he ‘tell his Common Market counterparts that nowhere is the 
stupidity of the Common Market so evident as in his three areas of responsibility? In 
agriculture, it has meant inefficient production. In fisheries, the absence of an exclusive 
zone continues to threaten the very livelihood of our fishermen. In food, it has meant 
inflated food prices and mountains of waste.’75 In that same month the Labour Party 
National Executive Committee (NEC), dominated by the left wing of the party, called 
for the question of EC membership to be reopened. In June 1978 an anti-EC group, the 
Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, issued a manifesto on which the party 
should campaign in the EP elections the following year. The manifesto, championed by 
Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, was vociferously opposed to British EC 
membership; one of the first issues it aimed to tackle was a ‘complete overhaul of the 
notorious Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that we can import cheaper food from 
world markets and abolish the food mountains’.76 
With anti-Marketeer sentiment rife in the Labour party and support for EC 
membership dwindling in the population as a whole, Callaghan’s minority government 
responded with a more hardline position on Europe. Silkin’s performance in Brussels 
was thus far from being out of tune with the government and the party. Indeed, the 
Parliamentary debate on the issue shows that while standing up to his partners in the 
Council in Brussels, at home Silkin was still attacked for not having driven an even 
harder bargain or indeed advocated the dismantling of the CAP.77 The CAP thus 
became an easy target, used to question Britain’s EC membership, spread doubt on its 
benefits and to campaign for withdrawal from the Community.  
Given the domestic situation and his personal preferences, Silkin continued his 
collision course in the Council of Agricultural Ministers. In a statement following the 
Council in March 1979 – his last one - he again let off steam:  
‘I regard any increase in common prices as an act of cynical and contemptuous 
indifference to the interests not only of the United Kingdom, but also to the 
overwhelming majority of people throughout Europe. Confronted with the 
irrefutable evidence of waste and bad management in the common agricultural 
policy, it has become impossible any longer to ignore it. … [It is] the United 
Kingdom that is expected to agree to these so-called “compromise” proposals to 
raise food prices, taxes, the mountains of wasted food and the intolerable transfer 
of resources from the United Kingdom to other and richer member countries. ... I 
may be alone in this Council. I shall try to bear it with fortitude, as I have done – 
from time to time in the past.’78  
This outburst, first and foremost for the consumption of the British public and 
the anti-Marketeers in the Labour party, comprised all the criticisms the government 
had levied against the CAP for the last six years: food mountains, increase in food 
prices, costs to the Exchequer and the consumer as well as the idea that the UK, then 
one of the poorer countries in the Community, was funding inefficient European 
farmers and was barred from importing cheaper food from third countries. His tirade 
demonstrated the isolation Silkin was prepared to accept, as he was not forging effective 
links with his partners in the Council.79 Rather, in a difficult economic, social and 
political climate in the UK, Silkin needed and wanted to be seen as protecting British 
interests in Brussels. Given that the British farm sector was rather small, he also did not 
risk great opposition by farmers at home as did for example his French, Dutch or 
German counterparts. Silkin’s ‘brutal’ style affected relations with the other member 
states but was applauded at home.80 It is not unreasonable to conclude that the constant 
opposition to the CAP fostered an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ sentiment in the British public and 
among parts of the political elites already during the first years following British 
accession.  
 
4. Elusive Allies: The Fickle Germans 
While it was well-known in Whitehall that French politicians put their farmers on a 
pedestal and regarded them as the backbone of French society, British Prime Ministers 
were surprised that the Germans, in particular the governing Social Democrats, held a 
similar view.81 Attempts by Heath and his successors to gain the support of the German 
government, also a net payer into the EC budget and deemed a natural ally, failed 
repeatedly. Foreign Office and Cabinet Office documents suggest that British ministers 
and civil servants were puzzled over the German attachment to the CAP. The Foreign 
Office was set on the case to solve this mystery, thus shining a spotlight on German 
governments’ ambiguous attitude towards the CAP.82 The FCO recognised that even 
with Chancellor Schmidt (1974-82) willing to back CAP reform, he would have had to 
persuade both the German Agricultural Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, in the latter 
of which ‘the development of the Community, and European considerations generally, 
loom large’. The study concluded: ‘Germany is not prepared to challenge the basic 
principles of the CAP because she knows that the French, and others, would not accept 
its abandonment.’83 Like all German governments, Schmidt and his coalition 
government also succumbed to the German ambiguity regarding the CAP: a general 
dislike for and open criticism of the policy went hand in hand with a support of the 
status quo.84  
When Callaghan became Prime Minister in 1976, he developed a close and 
cordial relationship with Schmidt.85 However, Callaghan’s, and also later Margaret 
Thatcher’s, reluctance to adopt the European Monetary System (EMS), which Schmidt 
had enthusiastically promoted in 1978, meant that Schmidt would in turn be even less 
likely to challenge his farm minister, Josef Ertl from the Free Democratic Party (the 
Social Democrats’ junior coalition partner), and thus threaten the survival of his own 
coalition government to tackle CAP reform with Callaghan. However, confusingly for 
the British, in his public statements Schmidt continued to be critical of the policy, for 
instance when in July 1978 at the Bremen European Council Schmidt claimed that he 
was prepared to ‘take on the vested interests of European agriculture’ … ‘given support 
from his partners’.86 While Schmidt could be relied on to criticise the CAP, he was less 
reliable when it came to taking action and would not be pushed to act in unison with the 
British. In a meeting between Schmidt and Callaghan in October 1978 Schmidt rowed 
back from his bold position in Bremen, saying that ‘he had to take account of the view 
of his Agricultural Minister’.87 Generally, German politicians tended to have a soft spot 
for small and poor farmers and grudgingly accepted the budgetary implications for 
Germany of price rises if they benefited small farmers. This was in contrast to the 
British government’s obsession with the costs created by the policy and the 
wastefulness of agricultural surpluses. Schmidt and his government also made sure that 
the issue would not result in a rift between them and their main Community ally, 
France. Not least, Germany came to see the policy as a useful bargaining tool to gain 
concessions from the French.88 At their meeting in late 1978, Schmidt invited Callaghan 
to send him a ‘non-paper’ setting out his ideas on improving the CAP. This set in 
motion a collaboration between the Cabinet Office and the Chancellery in Bonn that 
would continue under Prime Minister Thatcher until Schmidt ended the affair in 1981. 
Callaghan’s non-paper was duly prepared - in the Cabinet Office, not in MAFF. 
It was not even shown to Silkin or Foreign Secretary Owen. The paper set out the 
achievements of the CAP and its problems, focusing on how the policy encouraged 
surpluses and thus increased costs to the budget while at the same time hampering the 
development of other policies. The solutions Callaghan proposed were not 
revolutionary; he repeated the usual British insistence on a ‘realistic price policy’, 
denying any price increases for products in surplus. Hardship caused to farmers could 
be cushioned by national aids should a government so wish. This idea could have been 
acceptable to the Germans, but it would have been unacceptable to the French as it 
violated one of the CAP’s core principles of financial solidarity and the French were a 
net beneficiary of the CAP. In the paper, Callaghan also made Schmidt aware of the fact 
that the UK benefited very little from the budget because of the CAP and was due to 
become a net payer to the budget.89 
Callaghan and Schmidt got along with each other at a personal level and trust 
existed between both men. Callaghan was anxious that Schmidt understood the 
implications of the CAP and reminded his staff to keep the language of the paper as 
simple as possible, adding a handwritten note on a draft that he himself ‘gave up’. ‘[I]t 
is because Schmidt’s English is not as good as we think – and as he will read this in 
English – I don’t believe he will follow a lot of it.’90 It was perhaps naïve of the Prime 
Minister to think that his paper would open Schmidt’s eyes to the problems of the policy 
and give him ‘some ammunition to argue with Herr Ertl about CAP reform’.91 
Callaghan and the Cabinet office seemed to underestimate the domestic policy 
constraints Schmidt was under, holding together an increasingly volatile coalition with 
the FDP and keeping in check the still powerful German farmers’ lobby.  
Callaghan’s attempts to persuade Schmidt, as a fellow net-payer, to tackle CAP 
reform and the budget came to nothing. Schmidt preferred to focus on the EMS and 
showed disappointment in Callaghan’s decision in December 1978 to join the EMS but 
to keep Britain out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism that would have tied Sterling into 
a system of semi-fixed exchange rates.92 To the German chancellor this demonstrated 
that Britain was not prepared to be fully engaged in the Community and taking risks for 
CAP reform – domestically and with close Community partners – was not worth it. In 
1981 Schmidt broke off the backchannel discussions about the CAP. By then, CAP 
reform had become too closely linked to the British budget issue. The German 
chancellor might have become wary of being drawn into this issue and be seen as 
complicit with the British government’s quest for reduced contributions or a refund.93   
After Thatcher won the 1979 elections, the Prime Minister and British 
government ministers continued to seek close contacts with their German counterparts. 
They shared Labour’s idea that as a fellow net payer to the Community budget, and the 
largest one at that, the Germans were Britain’s primary allies.94 However, the 
relationship between Thatcher and Schmidt was initially not very cordial. Cabinet 
Office and Treasury civil servants were thus trying to mend fences and convince 
Thatcher of the importance of improving the relationship with Schmidt and gaining him 
as an ally.95 Since French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing lost the elections to 
Socialist François Mitterrand in May 1981, the traditional Franco-German relationship 
in the Community faced an uncertain future. Schmidt had supported his friend Giscard 
in the elections in spite of Mitterrand being a fellow Social Democrat. Mitterrand had 
campaigned on a very left-wing ticket and both Schmidt and Thatcher were united in 
their concern over France’s future economic policies. For the British government, this 
presented an opportunity to, if not replace, at least add an Anglo-German element to the 
traditional Franco-German motor in the Community. The summit meeting between 
Thatcher and Schmidt in May 1981 was successful and there was hope of Schmidt 
backing Thatcher for a ‘fairer deal’ in Europe. The press even spoke of an ‘Anglo-
German entente’.96 However, Schmidt was replaced, in the autumn of 1982, by Helmut 
Kohl, a Christian Democrat who would rekindle the Franco-German alliance with 
President Mitterrand. Kohl and Thatcher never found much to like about each other.97  
 
5. CAP Reform and the Budget Issue 
In 1979 the transition period came to an end and Britain would have to pay the full 
membership ‘fee’. The realisation how much Britain would actually have to pay came 
slowly and to obtain firm estimates was a difficult undertaking. The spending on the 
CAP fluctuated year on year, as did therefore member states’ contributions to the 
budget. The European Commission was not forthcoming with statistics on member 
states’ net contributions and net gains as it wanted to avoid a situation where member 
states asked for a juste retour of their contributions. The Treasury carried out its own 
calculations showing that between 1973 and 1977 Britain contributed about £2 bn to the 
Community budget and received about £1.2 bn from it.98 Callaghan added in the 
margins of the note: ‘Nigel, what this shows is that the Germans and ourselves are the 
largest contributors … as we are one of the poorer Members is this not absurd? And 
should I not say so?’99 Callaghan decided to indeed say something, not least as it 
became clear that the financial mechanism negotiated in the renegotiations on the terms 
of membership would not apply to the UK, as conditions were not fulfilled. The main 
avenues to remedy the situation were to reduce expenditure (i.e. the costs of the CAP), 
increase UK net receipts from the budget or reduce the UK’s share of the budget 
burden.100  
Callaghan first drew public attention to the issue in his speech to the Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet at Guildhall on 13 November 1978. In this speech he called for CAP 
reform as one of the main means to remedy the issue. In 1978 the policy consumed 75 
percent of the budget. Realistically, the expectations that British receipts, for example in 
regional or social policy, could be increased were seen as limited.101 By early 1979 it 
dawned on senior civil servants such as Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, that all of the 
devices officials have come up with to reduce Britain’s budget contribution or increase 
its receipts, even taken together, would not come close to narrowing, let alone closing, 
the gap between net contribution and receipts. Hunt expected the matter to be ‘a long 
process of attrition’ the beginning of which should best be postponed until after the 
general election.102 The general election in May 1979 returned a Conservative-led 
government under Prime Minister Thatcher to the House of Commons. It fell to her to 
address the budget issue. For a government which, when in opposition, had pledged to 
approach the EC with a more positive spirit than their Labour predecessor, it would be 
hard to reconcile this contentious issue with this conciliatory attitude. Impossible, 
really, as it turned out.  
6. Conclusion 
Britain’s journey to Community membership had been lengthy, with both major 
political parties struggling to adapt to post-war realities; being obliged to adopt a policy 
such as the CAP following accession did nothing to pacify the anti-Marketeers. Rather, 
it fuelled continued debates about the merits of EC membership within the Labour party 
in the 1970s but also the country as a whole. The CAP as a policy was not seen as 
working in the British interest. Rather, the policy seemed to underscore the drawbacks 
of being tied to common rules and supranational policies within the Community. The 
CAP was therefore resisted rhetorically both in Brussels and in London, particularly as 
it came to be tied up with the economic recession and, crucially, the unfolding problem 
of the British budget contribution that would dominate British policy towards the EC in 
the early 1980s.    
For Labour’s anti-Marketeers the CAP epitomised all that was wrong with the 
Community; the agricultural Sonderweg Britain had embarked on since the 19th century 
was compared positively against the ‘wastefulness’ of the Brussels CAP regime even 
though the deficiency payments system clearly also had its flaws.103 The Labour 
governments’ difficulties with the CAP contributed to shaping attitudes and setting the 
tone for the relationship between Britain and the rest of the Community. With a party 
irreconcilably torn over the issue of ‘Europe’, Prime Minister Callaghan did nothing to 
dispel Britain’s growing reputation as an ‘awkward partner’ in the Community. In fact, 
being ‘awkward’ in Brussels became a domestic necessity and came to be associated 
with the political survival of the Labour party, at least in the eyes of its leadership. What 
Young said about Labour’s predicament in the renegotiation 1974/75, namely that 
‘Britain’s role in the EEC was at the mercy of British domestic considerations’, applied 
to the remainder of the 1970s and, arguably, the entire period of Britain’s 
membership.104 The fact that with Commission President Roy Jenkins Britain had a 
fellow Labour politician at the helm of this important EC organisation made little 
difference to the Callaghan government’s relationship with ‘Brussels’. That the party 
eventually did break apart – with the creation of the Social Democratic Party in 1981 
and Jenkins one of its founders – precisely because of the party’s uncooperative 
European policy and increasing hostility to membership, is thus ironic.  
There is no doubt that the CAP posed a real difficulty for Britain. The country 
was at a disadvantage as it arrived ‘late at the party’. Britain had to adopt the acquis 
communautaire of the Community, which included recently completed supranational 
policies such as the CAP, and also the equally contested Common Fisheries Policy. 
While in the early 1960s, Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government had been 
‘enthusiastic about participation in a common European system of agricultural 
protection,’105 any such enthusiasm for the CAP had waned by 1973. The method for 
financing the CAP meant that Britain as a nation importing a large proportion of its 
foodstuffs was not gaining much from the CAP. It also meant that the UK had to adopt 
an agricultural policy that went against its two principles of ‘cheap bread’ and 
Commonwealth preference. In terms of the timing, Britain could not have joined the EC 
at a worse moment, at the end of the thirty-year post-war economic boom, when Europe 
and the Western world were entering into a period of economic recession, monetary 
turbulences, and structural unemployment. The wastefulness of the CAP, dramatically 
rendered visible in the food mountains, and the budgetary contributions linked to the 
policy, were thus proportionately more of an issue than had Britain joined in the more 
prosperous 1960s.  
From the early days of membership, the UK government envisaged CAP 
reform.106 This remained a constant and much repeated aim throughout the Heath 
government as well as the subsequent Labour governments. However throughout the 
1970s British politicians and civil servants were unable to spell out what shape or form 
such a reform should take. There is no indication in MAFF files that civil servants 
worked on serious reform proposals for the CAP. Reform ideas, albeit of a very general 
kind, were mainly floated in the Cabinet and Foreign Offices. This is also because John 
Silkin, who took over the agriculture portfolio in 1976, was an anti-Marketeer who was 
more interested in withdrawing from the Community than in substantial reform of a 
policy he rejected.  
Silkin is a good example that the way British politicians approached these 
challenges mattered and became a litmus test to how effectively they were adapting to 
the realities of Community membership. Would they be able to devise a Community 
diplomacy that was persuasive and effective? Would they try and be successful in 
modifying the CAP to suit British interests better? Ministers such as Silkin proved 
resistant to the idea of forging coalitions and engaging in the give and take of Council 
negotiations to advance their interests. This reluctance to adapt can partly be explained 
by anti-Marketeer conviction, or, for more Europhile politicians, by their fear of 
drawing domestic criticism for ‘going native’ and not defending the national interest. 
Wall argues that the British confrontational attitude was in fact a result of their 
ignorance and inexperience with continental politics, imposing on continental political 
leaders and ministers in coalition governments the need to find compromises.107 Indeed, 
politicians like Silkin were not used to such give and take and took it for a weakness. 
Ignorance of, or disinterest in, the domestic constraints of Community partners also 
explain the exaggerated faith placed in German Chancellor Schmidt’s ability and 
willingness to commit to CAP reform. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office 
seemed unaware of German domestic reality of coalition government and influential 
farm lobby wedded to the CAP on the one hand and Germany’s general acceptance of 
its own net payer status in the Community. Wall concluded that the lack of allies in the 
Community pushed the British government to adopt a more hardline position: ‘Without 
such alliances [like the Franco-German relationship], Britain tended to rely more on 
tenacity and obstinacy’ to defend its position.108  
Finally, the battles over the CAP accentuated the clash in philosophy over farm 
policy and the role of farmers in society that had been at the origin of the conflicts over 
the CAP between Britain and its continental partners. For the latter, particularly the 
French but also the Germans, the CAP became a yardstick for the UK’s commitment to 
European integration and their willingness reach compromises with their Community 
partners. Alongside the decision not to join the ERM, the battles over the CAP therefore 
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